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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between the preference for ro-
bustness of central bank (when it fears that its model is misspeciﬁed), the
inﬂation persistence and the output cost of disinﬂation. Using a simple
monetary game model in which higher preference for robustness of central
bank is positively associated with the inﬂation persistence and thus nega-
tively with the speed of disinﬂation, this paper shows that the output cost
of disinﬂation is higher when the less the central bank believes that its
reference model is robust.
Keywords : Model uncertainty, Robust control, Minmax policies, In-
ﬂation persistence, Sacriﬁce ratio.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, there is a rapidly growing literature to explain the high
degree of inﬂation persistence observed in the data. Recently, a research net-
work of economists from the national central banks of the euro area and the
European Central Bank (ECB) has been investigating the empirical evidence for
inﬂation persistence, its determinants and implications for monetary policy (see
Angeloni et al., 2003 for a summary), and alternative interpretations are proposed
to explain and remedy the high inﬂation persistence found in post-war U.S. data
(Taylor, 2000a and Cogley and Sargent, 2001).
In this context, several authors (Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Fuhrer, 2000; Calvo
et al., 2001; Christiano et al., 2005 and Blanchard and Gali, 2007) have proposed
1diﬀerent mechanisms to build inﬂation persistence into the deep structure of the
economy. Another point of view suggests that the degree of inﬂation persistence is
not only an inherent structural characteristic of industrial economies, but rather
may be due to changes in the orientation of monetary policy (Sargent, 1999;
Taylor, 2000b; Goodfriend and King, 2001 and Westelius, 2005). Thus, in an
environment with independence of central bank and transparency of monetary
policy, inﬂation expectations may become contained and, hence, price and wage
setters may be less inclined to change their contracts in response to shocks. In
this respect, the way that economic agents perceive major changes in the policy
regime, such as central bank independence and transparency of monetary policy,
has important implications for the short-run impact of monetary policy changes.
In eﬀect, the speed at which the economy reacts to a change in its environment
may be slow and the economy may not move quickly to a new equilibrium with
lower price expectations.
On the other hand, the degree of inﬂation persistence represents a key param-
eter of the monetary transmission mechanism and thus, it has important impli-
cations for the ability of monetary policy to stabilize inﬂation relative to output
as well as a signiﬁcant impact on the output cost of disinﬂation or sacriﬁce ratio
(Jordan, 1999 and Diana and Sidiropoulos, 2004). Therefore, the question of
how monetary policy should be set optimally when the structure of the economy
exhibits inﬂation persistence is crucial for monetary policy authorities.
However, the above literature is focused on how the characteristics of the
central banks may inﬂuence the inﬂation persistence without taking into account
the fact that policymakers do not have a complete knowledge of the true structure
of the economy. Thus, without the possibility to have a complete description
of reality, a policymaker is likely to prefer basing policy on principles that are
also valid if the assumptions on which the model is founded diﬀer from reality.
Actually, models rest on a set of assumptions that may or may not be good
approximations of true economies. In other words, policy prescriptions should be
robust to reasonable deviations from the benchmark model.
A relevant example seems to be the euro area for which such an examina-
tion seems particularly important. First, the euro area is a new and relatively
unexplored entity and, hence, the ECB faces substantial uncertainty about the
characteristics of the aggregate euro area inﬂation process. Second, the mixed
empirical evidence based on data for individual euro area member states provides
no clear indication of what type of model should be chosen for modelling the
aggregate inﬂation process. Hence, monetary policy rules should ideally be de-
signed to perform reasonably well under a range of alternative models of inﬂation
determination.
The growing literature on monetary policy robustness has been developed into
three directions. The ﬁrst one leads to what has been called robustly optimal
instrument rules (Svensson and Woodford, 2004; Giannoni and Woodford, 2003a,
2003b). As these instrument rules do not depend on the speciﬁcation of the
2generating processes of exogenous disturbances in the model, they are, therefore,
robust to misspeciﬁcation in these processes. The second one, initiated by Hansen
and Sargent (2001, 2003, 2007), corresponds to robust control approach to the
decision problem of agents who face model uncertainty. In the sense of Hansen
and Sargent, robust monetary policies are designed to perform well in worst-
case scenarios. These policies arise as the equilibrium in a game between the
monetary authorities and an evil agent who chooses model misspeciﬁcation to
make the authorities look as bad as possible. The third approach to robust control
is called structured Knightian uncertainty where the uncertainty is assumed to
be located in one or more speciﬁc parameters of the model, but where the true
values of these parameters are known only to be bounded between minimum and
maximum conceivable values (Onatski and Stock, 2002; Giannoni, 2002, 2007;
Tetlow and von zur Muehlen, 2004).
This paper investigates the degree of persistence characterising the inﬂation
process when the monetary policy-maker is faced with uncertainty about the
model. In this economic environment, the objective of our paper is to examine
analytically the eﬀects of increased model uncertainty, in the sense of Hansen and
Sargent (2007), on the inﬂation persistence and the sacriﬁce ratio using a sim-
ple Barro-Gordon economy model and where inﬂation persistence is introduced
through the data generating process for the structural shocks hitting the econ-
omy. We show that inﬂation persistence is greater when the central bank has
higher preference for model robustness.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section
3 introduces misspeciﬁcation and solves the equilibrium for the worst case model.
Section 4 analyzes the relationship between inﬂation persistence and preference
for robustness and the eﬀects of this latter on the sacriﬁce ratio. Section 5
concludes.
2 The model
As in Diana and Sidiropoulos (2004), we consider a simple monetary game model
extended to allow for persistent stochastic supply-side shocks (Rogoﬀ, 1985) and
indexed wage contracts (Ball, 1994; Gray, 1976). Output is given by using a
Cobb-Douglas production function to transform the sole variable input, homoge-
neous labor, in combination with other, ﬁxed, factors of production. Thus, the
relationship between output and employment at the aggregate level is described
by the following log-linear production function:
yt = αlt + ut , 0 < a < 1, (1)
where yt is the log of output, lt is the log of employment and the parameter ut
represents a random supply-side shock to production technology (to be speciﬁed
below). Firms decide on labor demand, ld






{PtYt − WtLt | Yt = L
α
t · exp(ut)}, (2)
where capital letters denote the according non-logarithmic variables. Thus, by




t = ˜ l −
1
1 − α
(wt − pt − ut), ˜ l > 0, (3)
where ˜ l = ln(α)/(1 − α), wt is the log of nominal wage and pt the log of output
price in time t. All workers are members of the economy-wide union, with the




t = ˜ l − δ + η(wt − pt), δ > 0, η > 0, (4)
where the intercept term in (4) is not set equal to that of the demand for labour
because we assume that the labour supply is aﬀected by distortions in the labour
market, captured by the parameter δ. Equating (3) and (4), and assuming,
without any loss of generality, that η = 0 (i.e., desired supply of labor is assumed
to be completely inelastic), we obtain:
b wt = pt + δ(1 − α), (5)
where b wt is the market-clearing or competitive equilibrium nominal wage that
would arise in the absence of nominal wage contracts and leads to the following
competitive equilibrium output level : b yt = ˜ y−κ+ut, with ˜ y = α˜ l and κ = αδ.
The treatment of wage determination, like that of Ball (1994), follows Gray
(1976). Wage contracts are negotiated and signed at the beginning of each period,
prior to the observation of the disturbances. These contracts specify a base wage,
Et−1 b wt, set at the expected market-clearing value, i.e., such that Et−1ld
t = ls
t,
and an indexation parameter, γ, relating the actual nominal wage to unexpected
movements in the price level, (pt − Et−1pt), following the indexing rule:
wt = Et−1 b wt + γ(pt − Et−1pt), 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, (6)
where Et−1 is the rational expectation operator and γ is the indexing parameter.
For γ = 1, wages are fully indexed, for 0 < γ < 1, wages are partially indexed
and for γ = 0, there is no indexation. Thus, a moral hazard problem arises,
justifying the incentive of workers to index their nominal wages to unexpected
price movements.
Once contracts are signed, workers are committed to supplying whatever
amount of labor ﬁrms demand, and employment, lt, is purely demand deter-
mined. The output is determined only by the level of employment since capital
is assumed ﬁxed. Integrating thus the equation (6) into (3) and using (1), we
obtain the following aggregate output supply function:
4yt = ( ˜ y − κ) + ξ(1 − γ)(πt − Et−1πt) + (1 + ξ)ut , ξ = α/(1 − α) > 0, (7)
where πt (= pt − pt−1) is the inﬂation rate and Et−1πt−1 (= Et−1pt − pt−1) is the
expected inﬂation rate. Finally, the parameter ut, representing a random supply-
side shock in this model, is assumed to pursue the following process:
ut = φut−1 + ￿t, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, (8)
where φ is the degree of autocorrelation in random supply-side shocks and ￿t is
a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and a variance varying
with φ so as to standardize the variance of ut at σ2
u, i.e., ￿t ∼ N [0,(1 − φ2)σ2
uI].
Note that the speciﬁcation of the way in which supply-side shocks evolve over
time in (8) is motivated by the choice of a simpler way to introduce the inﬂation
persistence in this model (see Bleaney, 2001; Diana and Sidiropoulos, 2004) than
through models including the inertia that overlapping wage contracts impart to
the inﬂation rate (Taylor, 1980). In this context, the autocorrelation coeﬃcient
φ shows that a random productivity shock is persistent and, since ut depends on
ut−1, this shock will be transmitted forward in time generating thus an inﬂation
persistence.
3 Robust monetary policy
To design the robust monetary policy, the central bank takes into account a
certain degree of model misspeciﬁcation by minimizing its objective function in
the worst possible model within a given set of plausible models.
3.1 Introducing misspeciﬁcation
We clarify here the monetary policy by assuming that the central bank sets the
inﬂation rate, πt, to minimize a standard objective function that is quadratic in













, λ > 0 (9)
where y∗ and π∗ are respectively the output and inﬂation targets, with π∗ normal-
ized to zero without any loss of generality. The parameter λ denotes the central
bank’s weight on inﬂation stabilization relative to the output stabilization and
the output target, y∗ = b yt+κ, is expressed in percentage points above the natural
output, b yt. However, the central bank has an uncertainty about model misspeci-
ﬁcation. Even if the model (7) is seen as the most likely model, the central bank
admits that this reference model may be misspeciﬁed. For that reason, it requests
to design its monetary policy to be robust against deviations from the reference
5model. To formalize these uncertainties about model misspeciﬁcation, we follow
Hansen and Sargent (2007) and introduce in equation (7) a speciﬁcation error,
designated by υt . Thus, the misspeciﬁed model is given by
yt = ( ˜ y − κ) + ξ(1 − γ)(πt − Et−1πt) + φ(1 + ξ)ut−1 + ￿t + υt (10)
The two disturbances terms have diﬀerent properties. The term ut is assumed to
be a random error with a prior known stochastic properties, whilst υt represents,
in the spirit of robust control, a totally ambiguous model misspeciﬁcation error,
in the sense that the policymaker is not able to assign any prior probability
distribution to υt. The model with υt = 0 represents the reference model, while
the models with υt 6= 0 represent candidate models surrounding the reference
model. In this context, as the central bank is assumed to be unable to provide
a probability distribution over diﬀerent deviations from the reference model, it
instead designs its monetary policy to be optimal in the worst possible outcome
within a neighborhood of reference model. Hence, the central bank’s doubts for
misspeciﬁcation may be formalized by assuming that the worst-case speciﬁcation
errors are chosen by a ﬁctitious evil agent to maximize central bank loss subject
to some constraints speciﬁed below.
Thus, the worst-case model is the model in which the central bank selects
the inﬂation rate to minimize its loss function while the evil agent selects the
speciﬁcation errors to maximize loss. This is the outcome that the central bank
worries the most and against which it desires monetary policy to be robust. On
the other hand, a more likely outcome of the model is one where the central
bank sets policy and agents form expectations to reﬂect misspeciﬁcation in the
worst-case model. However, when there is no such misspeciﬁcation, the reference
model turns out to be correct.
3.2 Setting up the control problem
In this context, the central bank allocates, according to its preference for ro-
bustness, a budget, h, to the evil agent, that is used to create misspeciﬁcation
in equation (7). The standard robust control problem would have a common
budget constraint on misspeciﬁcation in all equations of the model. This budget








where the parameter ht bounds the square of the central banks speciﬁcation error
υ2
t. Thus, the size of the distortion term υt must be bounded as the central bank’s
reference model remains an approximation of the real world system. Following



















subject to the misspeciﬁed model (10) end the evil agent’s budget constraint in
(11). The central bank thus sets the inﬂation rate to minimize the value of its
loss function, while the evil agent sets its controls to maximize the central bank’s













− µt [yt − ( ˜ y − κ) − ξ(1 − γ)(πt − Et−1πt) − φ(1 + ξ)ut−1 − ￿t − υt] , (13)
where µt is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (10) and the parameter
θ denotes the desire to be robust. This parameter is related to the evil agents
budget h, and determines the set of models available to the evil agent against
which the policymaker indicates the degree of model uncertainty, as well as the
central bank’s preference for robustness. As h approaches zero, the parameter
θ approaches to inﬁnity (θ → ∞), and the degree of misspeciﬁcation approaches
zero. This represents the case without model uncertainty. Inversely, a smaller
value of θ means an increasing degree of model uncertainty inducing greater
preference for robustness.
3.3 Optimality conditions
Assuming that neither the central bank nor the evil agent has access to any
commitment mechanism, we take expectations as given in the optimization and
look for a discretionary equilibrium. From the ﬁrst-order conditions we derive the
following optimality conditions relating output, yt, inﬂation, πt, and the degree











( yt − y
∗). (15)




ξ(1 − γ)υt. (16)
An interesting implication of these results is that the optimal inﬂation-output
trade-oﬀ in equation (14) is not aﬀected by the presence of model uncertainty
illustrated by the central bank’s preference for robustness θ (see Walsh, 2004).
On the other hand, equation (14) shows that the optimal monetary policy leans
against the wind, reducing the output when inﬂation is high. The coeﬃcient
7[λ/(1 − γ)ξ] of the optimal trade-oﬀ illustrates that if the central bank assigns
a large weight on inﬂation stabilization (λ) or if monetary policy has stronger
eﬀects on inﬂation through the output (γ is large and ξ is small), the optimal
trade-oﬀ is steeper, so the central bank reduces output more when inﬂation is
high.
We consider also that the worst-case speciﬁcation error υt in equation (16)
is larger in absolute value when inﬂation is far away from steady state. This
error tends to push inﬂation even further away, through speciﬁcation errors in
the aggregate output supply function (10). This speciﬁcation error forces the
central bank to move the output further to achieve the desired trade-oﬀ between
inﬂation and the output [see equation (14)]. When the output yt is below its
target y∗, the misspeciﬁcation is tend to lower the production by reinforcing a
negative supply shock, and on the other hand, increases the inﬂation rate. As
long as the central bank wants to be robust (so θ < ∞), the policymaker will
fear misspeciﬁcation in this equation.
3.4 Solving the worst-case model
To ﬁnd a closed-form solution for the robust control problem, we will look for the
worst-case solution for the endogenous variables, πt and yt, and the worst possible
degree of misspeciﬁcation or the evil agent’s instrument, υt. This equilibrium
solution illustrates the central bank’s worst fears of misspeciﬁcation and therefore
helps us to understand the design of the robust monetary policy.
We begin by looking for the optimal robust policy rule. The central bank
sets its policy instrument πt in order to minimize the expected value of the loss
function (12), taking Et−1πt and ut−1 as given, and after observing the current-
period supply shock. This yields :
πt =
θξ(1 − γ)
λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2 [κ + ξ(1 − γ)Et−1πt − ξ (φut−1 + ￿t)]. (17)








(1 − γ)(κ − ξφut−1). (18)
The next step is to ﬁnd the solutions of the worst-case model. Using equations
(17), (18) and (10), we will thus ﬁnd a solution for the endogenous variables πt








(1 − γ)(κ − ξφut−1) −
θξ2(1 − γ)
λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2￿, (19)















λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2
￿
￿t, (20)






(κ − ξφut−1) +
λξ
λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2￿t. (21)
The above solution for the worst-case model is the reduced form under the worst
possible case of misspeciﬁcation. In this context, the evil agent chooses the spec-
iﬁcation errors to be as damaging as possible, and the optimal policy rule of the
central bank and the expectations of the private sector reﬂect this misspeciﬁ-
cation. Equations (17) and (18) are both the reaction functions describing the
central bank’s policy rule and private agents’ expectations of inﬂation. Both
of them are dependent on the preference for robustness (θ) as the central bank
fears misspeciﬁcation in the model. Since the private sector shares the doubt of
central bank about the reference model, it takes into account this uncertainty
when forming their expectations. Equations (19) and (20) show that the equi-
librium solutions for πt and yt depend not only on the central bank’s preference
for robustness (θ) and supply-side shocks of the current period, ￿t, but also that
of the last period, ut−1. Equation (21) determines the worst possible degree of
misspeciﬁcation or the evil agent’s instrument, υt, which is restricted to respond
to the same variables as the policymaker.
Using the above solution of the worst-case model, we next analyze how an
increase in central bank preference for robustness (that is, a decrease in θ) aﬀects
the economy on the equilibrium. We consider modest preference for robustness
(so that, the worst-case model misspeciﬁcation is not easily identiﬁed by the
policymaker) and we analyze the eﬀects of small decreases in θ starting from
θ = ∞. Thus to understand the eﬀects of robustness on monetary policy we ﬁrst
study the worst-case model for inﬂation, output and inﬂation expectations. We
establish the following propositions:
Proposition 1 In the worst-case model, a stronger preference for robustness of
the central bank against misspeciﬁcation (i.e., a decrease in θ) increases the sen-
sitivity of inﬂation (πt), as well as the sensitivity of output (yt) to the supply-side
shocks (￿t).
Proof. Using equation (19) of the worst-case model to obtain the eﬀects of a
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2 > 0. (24)
















Proposition 2 In the worst-case model, a stronger preference for robustness of
the central bank against the model misspeciﬁcation (i.e., a decrease in θ) increases
the expected inﬂation, increases the sensitivity of expected inﬂation to the inﬂation
bias (κ = αδ) due to the labor market distortions (δ), but decreases the sensitivity
of expected inﬂation to the central bank’s preference for inﬂation target (λ).
Proof. To establish this proposition, we use (18) to derive the eﬀects of a







(κ − ξφut−1) > 0 (25)
As θ > 1 and γ ∈ (0,1), and assuming that κ > ξφut−1, we obtain −∂ (Et−1πt)/∂θ >
0.Then, the eﬀects of a decrease in θ on the absolute values of ∂ (Et−1πt)/∂λ and








































λ(θ − 1)2 < 0 (28)
Note that in the above results a positive sign implies that the variable in ques-
tion becomes more sensitive to that particular shock when robustness increases,
and vice versa. A lower value of the parameter θ corresponds to a stronger fear
of the central bank for model misspeciﬁcation. In this context, the above results
(23) and (24) show that the less central bank considers that its reference model
is robust (or central bank has a stronger preference for robustness), the higher
the sensitivity of inﬂation to the supply-side shocks is. These results reveal that
the robust central bank fears that inﬂation and output gap are more sensitive to
shocks and therefore more volatile than in the reference model, as the worst-case
misspeciﬁcation increases the volatility of all variables (see Leitemo and S¨ oder-
str¨ om, 2008).
10Equation (25) shows that a fear of model misspeciﬁcation leads to a higher
expected inﬂation. As the central bank considers that its reference model is less
robust (stronger preference for robustness) and since the private sector shares the
doubt of central bank about the reference model, it takes into account this doubt
when forming its expectations of inﬂation. On the other hand, (26) shows that
the less the central bank considers that its reference model is robust (a stronger
preference for robustness), the higher is the sensitivity of expected inﬂation to
the central bank’s preference for the inﬂation target (or aversion for inﬂation)
is. That is, the robust central bank fears that expected inﬂation is more volatile
than in the reference model and responds more aggressively to variations on the
weight assigned to the inﬂation target.
4 Monetary policy and inﬂation persistence
The main focus of our next analysis concerns the relationship between the cen-
tral bank’s preference for robustness and the inﬂation persistence as well as the
resulting output cost of disinﬂation.
4.1 Introducing inﬂation persistence
We attempt here to determine the relationship between the parameter of pref-
erence for robustness θ and the degree of inﬂation persistence. The inﬂation
persistence, captured by the relation : πt = ρπ πt−1, may be calculated by using
the correlation coeﬁcient ρπ between πt and πt−1, as :
ρπ = Cov (πt,πt−1)/Var (πt). (29)
To determine Var(πt) ≡ E [(πt − ¯ π)2] and Cov(πt,πt−1) ≡ E [(πt − ¯ π)(πt−1 − ¯ π)],




ξ(1 − γ)κ. (30)
Due to the overly ambitious output target of the policymaker, κ, the unconditional
inﬂation is not zero. In fact, this inﬂation bias depends on the degree of model
uncertainty. Combining equations (19) and (30), the diﬀerence of inﬂation rate
from its mean is







λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2εt
￿
, (31)







φ2[λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2]




[λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2]
2 . (32)
The variability of the inﬂation is determined principally by the variance of the
supply shock σ2
u premultiplied by a coeﬃcient depending upon the structural and
preference parameters.
To obtain the covariance of the inﬂation rates πt and πt−1, we use equation
(19) for the period t−1 and, from equation (8), the fact that φut−2 = ut−1−￿t−1.
Finally, considering that the unconditional mean of πt−1 is also equal to ¯ π, and









Finally, using equations (29), (32) and (33), it follows the correlation coeﬃ-
cient (or inﬂation persistence), ρπ, between πt and πt−1, as:
ρπ =
φΩ2
φ2Ω2 + λ2(θ − 1)2, (34)
where Ω = λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2 > 0. It is easy to verify that the correlation
coeﬃcient is non negative (ρπ ≥ 0). To ensure also that ρπ ≤ 1, we need :
















This condition determines another lower bound of the central bank’s preference
for robustness θ which depends on the structural parameters (ξ,γ,φ) and the
relative weight assigned to inﬂation stabilization λ. Therefore, the degree of
inﬂation persistence ρπ is determined by the central bank’s preference parameters
(i.e. preference for inﬂation stabilization λ, and the preference for robustness θ)
and the structural parameters (γ, ξ and φ).
4.2 The eﬀects of central bank robustness
We discuss in this section the eﬀects of central bank’s preference for robustness
on the degree of inﬂation persistence and the sacriﬁce ratio. In this respect, we
establish the following propositions:
Proposition 3 The increase in the preference for robustness of the central bank
against the model misspeciﬁcation (i.e., a decrease in θ) increases the inﬂation
persistence (ρπ).
12Proof. To establish this result, we take the ﬁrst derivative of ρπ with respect




2φ[λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2]
2 λ2(θ − 1)
￿
φ2 [λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2]
2 + λ2(θ − 1)2￿2. (36)




The intuition behind the above result (36) is that as the central bank has a
stronger preference for robustness (i.e., a decrease in θ), or the less the central
bank believes that its reference model is robust, the higher the inﬂation persis-
tence will be. In fact, inﬂation persistence may arise for several reasons: On
the one hand, the inertia due to a slow adjustment of inﬂation expectations.
According to our previous result (25) in Proposition 2, a fear of model misspeciﬁ-
cation leads to a higher expected inﬂation and thus a greater inﬂation persistence.
Moreover, as we have shown in Proposition 1, an increase in the preference for
robustness positively aﬀects the variability of inﬂation and therefore, the inﬂation
persistence Second, other determinants such as the inertia of imperfect credibil-
ity due to a low degree of central bank’s aversion for inﬂation (designed by the
parameter λ), a higher degree of shock persistence when the supply-side shocks
are highly correlated (designed by the parameter φ), or the inertia that wage
and price contracts captured here by a low degree of wage indexation (parameter
γ). In this context, we attempt to establish the relationship between the prefer-
ence for robustness and these determinants of inﬂation persistence. The following
propositions can be derived.
Proposition 4 A stronger preference for robustness against the model misspec-
iﬁcation (i.e., a decrease in θ) decreases the sensitivity of inﬂation persistence
(ρπ) to the central bank’s aversion of inﬂation (λ).
Proof. To set-up this result, we take from equation (34) the ﬁrst derivative




2φθA2 [λ(θ − 1) + θA2]λ(θ − 1)2
[λ2(θ − 1)2(1 + φ2) + φ2θ2A4 + 2λφ2θA2(θ − 1)]
2 < 0. (37)
As θ > 1 and A ≡ ξ(1 − γ) > 0 since γ ∈ (0,1), we obtain : ∂ρπ/∂λ < 0. Then,










2φλA2(θ − 1){λ3(θ − 1)3(1 + φ2) + 2θλ2A2(θ − 1)2}
[λ2(θ − 1)2(1 + φ2) + φ2θ2A4 + 2λφ2θA2(θ − 1)]
3
−
2φλA2(θ − 1){φ2θ2A4 [2θA2 + 3λ(θ − 1)]}
[λ2(θ − 1)2(1 + φ2) + φ2θ2A4 + 2λφ2θA2(θ − 1)]
3 . (38)






Proposition 5 An increase in the preference for robustness of the central bank
against the model misspeciﬁcation (i.e., a decrease in θ) decreases the sensitivity
of inﬂation persistence (ρπ) to the degree of supply-side shock persistence (φ).
Proof. To set-up this result, we take from equation (34) the ﬁrst derivative




[λ2(θ − 1)2(1 − φ2) − θ2ξ4(1 − γ)2]Ω2
￿
φ2 [λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2]
2 + λ2(θ − 1)2￿2, (39)




> 0. Then, the eﬀect of a decrease in θ on the value of the above













2λ2(θ − 1)[θ2ξ4(1 − γ)4 + λ2(θ − 1)2 (3φ2 − 1)]Ω2
￿
φ2[λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2]
2 + λ2(θ − 1)2￿3 < 0. (40)
As θ > 1 and γ ∈ (0,1), when 3φ2 > 1 ⇒ φ >
p








Proposition 6 The increase in the preference for robustness of the central bank
(i.e., a decrease in θ) decreases the sensitivity of inﬂation persistence (ρπ) to the
wage indexation parameter (γ).












λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2
￿2
(41)
Then, we get respectively the ﬁrst derivative of ρπ with respect to g and the ﬁrst










4θξ2(1 − γ)(θ − 1)2
[λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2]
3 > 0
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4θξ2(1 − γ)(θ − 1)[2θξ2(1 − γ)2 + λ(θ − 1)]
[λ(θ − 1) + θξ2(1 − γ)2]
4 < 0 (43)








￿/∂θ < 0 .
According to results (37), (39) and (42) respectively in the three above propo-
sitions, the inﬂation persistence may arise from several reasons, including: i)
the inertia that imperfect credibility (due to a low degree of central bank inde-
pendence) may impart to inﬂation, ii) the inertia that supply-side productivity
shocks may impart to inﬂation, or iii) the inertia that nominal wage indexation
imparts to inﬂation. The ﬁrst result reveals a negative relationship between the
relative weight assigned by the central bank on inﬂation stabilization (or central
bank’s aversion to inﬂation, λ) and the inﬂation persistence. The second result
illustrates a positive relationship between the inertia of supply-side productivity
shocks and the inﬂation persistence. In other words, a lower degree of the inertia
of supply-side productivity shocks (i.e. a lower φ) leads to a lower degree of the
inﬂation persistence. The third result shows a negative relationship between the
degree of wage indexation (parameter γ) and the inﬂation persistence or a posi-
tive relationship between the inertia of wage and price contracts and the inﬂation
persistence.
Further, we show respectively in (38), (40) and (43) that the above three
results on inﬂation persistence are deteriorated when the less the central bank
believes that its reference model is robust. That is, as the central bank has a
stronger preference for robustness (i.e., a decrease in θ), the lower the sensitivity
of the above three eﬀects on inﬂation persistence will be. These results conﬁrm
the outcome of proposition 3, so that an increase in central bank’s preference for
robustness positively aﬀects inﬂation persistence.
The intuition behind these results is the following. Normally, an increasing
inﬂation aversion (greater value of λ) stabilizes better inﬂation and decreases the
inﬂation persistence. However, the presence of model uncertainty leads to a higher
inﬂation, which reduces the stabilization eﬀects of a greater value of inﬂation
aversion. Thus, the inﬂation persists in spite of the increasing inﬂation aversion.
The wage indexation eﬀects on inﬂation persistence may also be aﬀected by an
increase in the preference for model robustness. Once more, the introduction of
model uncertainty to our analysis, leading to more aggressive results with regard
to inﬂation, diminishes the stabilization eﬀects of wage indexation. The increase
in the preference for robustness of the central bank (i.e., a decrease in θ) decreases
the sensitivity of inﬂation persistence (ρπ) to the wage indexation parameter (γ).
154.3 Speed and cost of disinﬂation
We examine now the eﬀects of central bank robustness on the output cost of
disinﬂation or the sacriﬁce ratio through its eﬀects on inﬂation persistence (or
speed of disinﬂation). The sacriﬁce ratio is computed here by ﬁrst adding up all
output losses during the phase of disinﬂation and then dividing this sum by the
achieved reduction of inﬂation. The following proposition can be established.
Proposition 7 The increase in the preference for robustness of the central bank
(i.e., a decrease in θ), by increasing the degree of inﬂation persistence (closely
connected to the speed of disinﬂation), increases the output cost of disinﬂation or
sacriﬁce ratio.





(¯ y − yt+i)/∆π, (44)
We ﬁrst compute the size of the disinﬂation ∆π between t and t + 1 : ∆π =
πt+1−πt. Starting from a situation with an initial inﬂation πt equal to its mean ¯ π
and assuming that the inﬂation rate follows an AR(1) process: πt+1 = ρππt = ρπ¯ π,
we can write:
∆π = −(1 − ρπ) ¯ π, (45)
where we consider the average inﬂation rate as given when policymaker deter-
mines the inﬂation rate in a speciﬁc period. Using respectively equations (44)
and (45), we obtain:
∂ (sr)/∂ρπ =
X
(¯ y − yt+i)/(ρπ − 1)
2 ¯ π > 0 . (46)










As ∂ρπ/∂θ < 0 from (36) and ∂ (sr)/∂ρπ > 0 from (46), we get : ∂ (sr)/∂θ > 0.
According to this result, the model predicts a cost of disinﬂation which is
increasing with the degree of the central bank’s preference for robustness. In par-
ticular, the intuition behind this result is that a higher preference for robustness
of central bank is positively associated with the inﬂation persistence and thus
negatively associated with the speed of disinﬂation. Therefore, this paper shows
that the output cost of disinﬂation is higher when the central bank believes less
that its reference model is robust and thus its preference for robustness is higher.
16Table 1: Parameter values for the model calibration
Model Shocks Policy
φ ξ γ εt ut−1 λ k
0.77 1.5 0.5 0.001 0.01 2 1
4.4 A numerical example
To demonstrate the analytical results more intuitively, we provide the following
numerical simulations. All parameters values are presented in Table 1.
We ﬁrst compute the degree of inﬂation persistence as a function of the de-
gree of model uncertainty. Figure 1 shows how the degree of inﬂation persistence
varies with diﬀerent levels of the preference for robustness.1 The decreasing curve
implies the negative relationship between ρ and θ. As the degree of model uncer-
tainty increases (smaller values of θ), the inﬂation persistence increases as well.
Moreover, when θ takes small values, a trivial decrease of this latter induces a
rather large increase in the degree of inﬂation persistence. Whereas, as the values
of θ are higher, the inﬂation persistence is less sensitive to that variations. As
shown in Figure 1, the curve becomes less steeper for higher values of θ. This
observation yields an interesting implication. If both the private agents and the
central bank rather believe in the reference model (relative great values of θ), a
small increase in the preference for robustness does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
inﬂation persistence. While their doubts about the reference model turn out to
be more important (relative small values of θ), the inﬂation persistence becomes
more sensitive to changes in the preference for robustness.
Another factor that inﬂuences the process of inﬂation dynamics is the exoge-
nous wage indexing parameter γ. It is thus of interest to examine the eﬀect of
wage indexing behavior on the disinﬂation rate. For this purpose, we repeat the
simulation with the same numerical value for λ, φ and ξ, letting the indexing pa-
rameter vary. Figure 2 shows the evolutions of the degree of inﬂation persistence
under diﬀerent indexing parameters, taking account of model uncertainty. Under
the same degree of model uncertainty, inﬂation exhibits a higher inertia if the
wage indexing rate is relatively low. According to the optimal conditions (14)
and (16), a small value of wage indexing worsens the output-inﬂation trade-oﬀ
(i.e. 1 − γ becomes greater) and strengthens the misspeciﬁcation. Consequently,
inﬂation become more sluggish under a low indexing wage setting behavior.
Using the expression of output yt given by Eq.(20), we can obtain













λ(θ − 1) + θA2
￿
εt. (48)
Inserting the latter into equation (44), together with (30) and (45), we can com-
1When choosing the numerical values for θ, we have veriﬁed that the lower bound condition
(35) are satisﬁed under this parameter set.
17pute the sacriﬁce ratio. Figure 3 plots the changes in the sacriﬁce ratio when
the preference for robustness decreases (an increase in θ) using the parameter
values given in Table 1. The decreasing curve is in accordance with the negative
relationship between sr and θ shown by equation (47).
5 Concluding remarks
This paper examines the relationship between the preference for robustness of
central bank against the model misspeciﬁcation and the inﬂation persistence or
the speed of disinﬂation. We use a simple monetary game model in which a
stronger preference for robustness of the central bank is positively associated
with the inﬂation persistence and therefore negatively related with the speed of
disinﬂation. In this framework, we have shown that the output cost of disinﬂation
(or sacriﬁce ratio), associated positively with the inﬂation persistence, will be
higher when the preference for robustness is higher and thus less the central bank
believes that its reference model is robust. The policy implication lurking behind
this ﬁnding is that a central banker who faces model uncertainty, should design
and implement his robust monetary policy taking into account that the inﬂation
persistence will be higher.
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Figure 1: Inﬂation persistence under model uncertainty, (the impact of θ)
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Curve 3: gamma=0,85     
Figure 2: Inﬂation persistence under model uncertainty, with diﬀerent indexing
parameters








Figure 3: Sacriﬁce ratio under model uncertainty
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